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On 25 April 1974 the Portuguese New State 
was overthrown in a peaceful military coup led 
by permanent military officers. These officers 
had previously set up the Movement of the Cap-
tains, initially for professional reasons; thereaf-
ter, they established the Armed Forces Move-
ment (MFA), which was clearly politicised and 
espoused the belief that the colonial war would 
only end with the demise of the existing re-
gime. On the night of 24–25 April, various mil-
itary units took over strategic positions in Lis-
bon and, hours later, in Oporto and other cities. 
The regime fell after a day of mobilisation, ne-
gotiations and some incidents. The prime min-
ister, Marcelo Caetano, handed over power to 
General António de Spínola at the Carmo head-
quarters of the National Republican Guard.1 On 
26 April the creation of the National Salvation 
Junta (JSN) was announced, chaired by Spínola. 
A decree law was promulgated that dismissed 
the former government, dissolved the nation-
al assembly, the political police PIDE/DGS,2 the 
Portuguese Legion3 and the Portuguese Youth, 
the organs of censorship and the single party, 
National Popular Action, and removed Presi-
dent Américo Tomás. At the same time, an am-
nesty for all political crimes was approved, and 
approximately 130 political prisoners who were 
held in Peniche and Caxias were released. 
The impact of the coup transcended national bor-
ders in a world divided by the Cold War and deeply 
shaken by the recent oil crisis. Those who rushed 
to establish a parallel between events in Portu-
gal and Chile a year earlier were quickly proved 
wrong. Against all predictions and models of mil-
itary interventions in processes of transition and 
political change, the April Captains presented a 
democratising programme that included the es-
tablishment of a civilian government and free 
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elections. After more than a decade of war on various fronts in Africa, the military unexpectedly initi-
ated a process of decolonisation that quickly culminated in the granting of independence to the former 
colonial peoples. This singular event took the scholarly community by surprise, who then faced the 
difficult task of integrating the Portuguese case into the analysis of transitional politics frameworks.4 
The MFA stated that its aim was not to take power but rather to guarantee that elections would be 
held within a reasonable timeframe. For various reasons, however, this did not happen. Spínola 
had his own political project, as laid out in his book Portugal e o Futuro (Portugal and the future) 
and in his stance during the discussion of the MFA’s programme. His project became clear during 
his first public speeches: he wanted the establishment of a presidential regime, a gradual transition 
undertaken in a climate of social order and discipline, and a federative referendum-style solution 
to the colonial issue. These proposals clearly contradicted the MFA programme, which called for 
elections to a constituent assembly within a year and, above all, “the right of peoples to self-deter-
mination”. Thus, the Captains abandoned their initial aim of handing over power after the toppling 
of the regime. The first clashes between the MFA and Spínola became fertile ground for the grad-
ual transformation of the MFA into a political actor in the new political order.5 
The first provisional government (May–July 1974) still reflected the strong influence of Spínola and 
his project to rapidly extinguish the MFA. But in the second provisional government the military was 
predominant over civilian elements, and reflected the MFA’s growing influence. The JSN itself was 
strongly influenced by the MFA, particularly through Colonel Vasco Gonçalves, who was close to 
the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and who was prime minister between the second and the 
fifth provisional governments (from 12 July 1974 to 19 September 1975). Gonçalves was respon-
sible for the adoption of key social measures in this transition period, including agrarian reform, 
the nationalisation of key private enterprises (banks, insurance companies, public transport and 
steelworks, among others); the introduction of a minimum wage for civil servants and, through 
decree law 169-D/75 of 31 March, the introduction of unemployment benefit. The tutelage of the 
MFA was also developed through other institutions: first, the Commission for Programme Coordi-
nation established before the coup; then, the Council of the Twenty; next, the MFA assemblies; and 
finally, the Revolution Council. The latter was only dissolved in 1982, which is why some scholars 
argued that the end of the transition and democratic consolidation was only achieved that year.6 
The MFA was not internally united and uniform: there were strong divergent currents from the out-
set because of the influence of different parties and political groups. The current that surrounded 
Gonçalves was close to the PCP and had the greatest institutional influence, since the colonel was 
the prime minister in most of the provisional governments between July 1974 and September 1975. 
Despite these conflicts within the MFA and between the movements and outside forces, the JSN 
managed to guide the country through the constituent assembly elections on 25 April 1975, as prom-
ised. These were the first free elections on the basis of universal suffrage ever held in Portugal and 
were won, with 37.87% of the votes, by the Socialist Party (PS), followed by the Popular Democratic 
Party (PPD),7 with 26.39% and the PCP, which obtained 12.46%. Ana Mónica Fonseca states that, de-
spite the diversity represented in the parties involved in the development of the constitution, “there 
was a common element, which was the revolutionary spirit, reflected in resorting to left-wing lan-
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guage appealing to Socialism … that was transversal to all proposals” and also that “the inevitable 
branding of the constitutional projects resided precisely in the resort to symbols and elements of the 
political agenda that had become property of the most unexpected parties, such as the PPD or the 
CDS”.8 After these elections and the formation of the constituent assembly on 2 June 1975, the most 
convulsive period of the Portuguese transition began, the so-called “hot summer”. The Gonçalvist cur-
rent played a leading role during these turbulent months, while attempting to marginalise and institu-
tionalise the social conflicts and the open clashes between the extreme left and right political wings. 
However, Gonçalves was criticised by moderate forces, such as the PS and the PPD, which accused 
him of wanting to institute a socialist regime; and by radical forces, which accused him of not being 
revolutionary “enough”. Another faction of the MFA was closer to the PS, and a third faction identi-
fied primarily with Colonel Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, who was connected with the extreme leftwing, 
mainly radical third-wordlist, scene and committed to defending the “popular power”. 
The Gonçalvist programme succumbed to the extreme left and the moderate opposition within the 
MFA. In September 1975, the fifth provisional government fell and the rather more moderate sixth 
provisional government was formed, without Gonçalves and the Gonçalvistas. On 25 November, 
an attempted military coup by officers close to the extreme left created a pretext for a countercoup 
by moderates, which put an end to social agitation and to the Gonçalvist period.9 Finally, on 25 April 
1976, Portugal held its first ever general elections with universal suffrage, in which the PS gained 
the majority of the votes, followed by the centre-right (PPD and CDS) and, in fourth place, the PCP.
A coup d’état which became a revolution
As is well known, the 25 April 1974 coup was immediately followed by broad political and popular 
mobilisation, in which all political and social forces expressed the various positions that had been 
evolving in the final years of the New State regime. This turbulent period in contemporary Portu-
guese history, which was referred to as the Revolutionary Process Underway (PREC), was marked 
by intense conflict between opposing political forces (mainly the extreme left, the extreme right 
and the conservatives), attempted coups and countercoups, massive social mobilisation and the 
occupation of land and factories.10 
Some authors have stressed that the political crisis after the fall of regime was the fundamental 
cause of this exceptional mobilisation.11 Other studies consider that the prerevolutionary cycle of 
protest, which began in 1969, and the increasing division of the elites, also explain the particular 
characteristics of the Portuguese transition.12 In any case, different social scientists agree that the 
PREC was one of the periods that witnessed the most intense mobilisation in postwar Europe.13 
Moreover, as various analysis have underlined, this social unrest was a key factor in corroborating 
the rupture dimension of the Portuguese transition, by pressing institutional forces – such as the 
MFA or the provisional governments – to adopt more radical measures.14 
Considering this reality, the strong social mobilisation played a crucial role in contributing as much to a 
major break with the authoritarian past – the rapid dissolution of authoritarian institutions, purges and 
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political trials – as to the implementation of important social reforms. Thus, as stressed by by political 
scientist António Costa Pinto, “it is the nature (collapse) of the authoritarian regime’s downfall and the 
character of the ‘anti-authoritarian’ coalition during the first provisional governments that provoked a 
symbolic break with the past”15 and “the state crisis constituted an important ‘window of opportunity’ 
for the Portuguese type of transitional justice … In the Portuguese case, specifically in public and pri-
vate companies, the purges were transformed into a facet of the social movements’ radicalisation.”16
In this light, “the ‘revolutionary period’ of 1974–75 was the most complex phase of the transition” 
in which “it is still unclear what kind of regime is to be established”.17 This perspective of the transi-
tion processes as periods in which the political results are uncertain is shared by Leonardo Morli-
no, who considers that transitions are “a fluid and uncertain period in which democratic structures 
are emerging”.18 From a rather less deterministic perspective, Michel Dobry prefers the concept of 
“political crisis”19 instead of “transition”, which is an interpretative instrument brilliantly applied by 
Diego Palacios Cereales in his analysis of the Portuguese revolutionary period.20 All these studies 
help us understand the very specific case of regime change which was the Portuguese transition: 
a coup d’état which became a revolution.
The ‘austere anniversary’ of the Portuguese spring
The revolutionary experience introduced a set of social reforms which have proved an invalua-
ble heritage for Portuguese democracy in terms of social and political rights. Fundamental social 
measures, such as the minimum wage for civil servants and the introduction of unemployment 
benefit, were adopted during the so-called “hot summer” of 1975, while the 1976 constitution con-
tinued to develop a strong role in defending basic principles of equality. 
Approved on 2 April 1976, the constitution of the Portuguese Republic was the legitimating base 
for the 25 April 1976 elections, in which the first parliament, the Assembly of the Republic, was 
elected. Fonseca sustains that the constitution “became the bigger symbol of the instalment of 
a democratic pluralist and parliamentary regime”.21 Meanwhile, as Jorge Miranda states, these 
components, which aimed at the instalment of a liberal democracy, coexisted, until the first con-
stitutional review in 1982, with different elements, such as the recognition of the sovereignty of a 
military organ, the Revolution Council. 
There were other aspects of discontinuity in respect to liberal constitutions such as the articles 
pointing towards a “transition to socialism” (art. 2) through the “collective appropriation of the main 
means of production, lands and natural resources, and the exercise of the democratic power by 
the working class” (art. 80). Moreover, the nationalisations that occurred in 1974 were confirmed, 
the implementation of the agrarian reform was prescribed, with the expropriation of estates, and 
great importance was attributed to the “democratic planning of the economy”. During a phase when 
social mobilisation had decreased and the political forces in charge were already in line with the 
liberal-democratic models present in other European countries – in the 1976 elections the PCP 
was reduced to the fourth party, behind the PS, PPD and CDS – the Portuguese constitution did in 
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fact inherit, in its substance, the demands of the PREC and continued the projects that had sprung 
up in the most radical period of transition. Guaranteeing the demands of the social movements 
unleashed by the coup hence became the greatest source of legitimacy for institutional power in 
democratic Portugal. As shall be shown, this role has become once again more relevant in recent 
times through the Constitutional Court. 
The first constitutional reviews22 in 1982 and 1989 partly modified these principles, reducing the 
ascendance of the state over the economy, mainly after Portugal joined the European Economic 
Community in 1986. Successive reviews in 1992 (following the Maastricht treaty), 1997 and 2001, 
along with the growth of liberal rights – more representation, less centralisation, increased re-
gional autonomy, more individual rights and guarantees – also conferred more weight to private 
initiative in the country’s economy. On the other hand, the 2003 review insisted mainly on aspects 
related to European integration, as did successive reviews in 2004 and 2005. In a more or less 
incisive manner, all these reforms aimed at limiting the state’s role in certain matters and the 
“de-ideologisation” of the constitution. 
However, according to Miranda, “the constitution is still, after seven constitutional reviews and 
without rupture, after Portugal joined the European Community … the same constitution that the 
Constituent Assembly approved in 1976”.23 It continues to play a fundamental role in defending the 
Portuguese people’s social and political rights. This role revealed itself as being even more im-
portant in later years, when Portugal experienced one of the harshest economic crises in its re-
cent history.
The 40th anniversary of the Portuguese revolution took place in 2014, in a context of profound so-
cial and financial crisis. Regarding the foreign assistance framework from the so-called troika rep-
resenting the International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank and European Union, Portuguese 
citizens have suffered, in recent years, from drastic measures that were imposed to contain public 
spending. Social inequality, represented by the Gini index, which had started to decrease from 2005, 
began to increase once again in 2011, in what is traditionally one of Europe’s most unequal coun-
tries.24 According to the United Nations Development Programme, Portugal has fallen in the human 
development indexes, from 29th place in 2007 to 43rd in 2013, moving further from countries with a 
“very high” index rating to those with a “high” index rating. According to Eurostat, the average sala-
ry measured by purchasing power in 2012 was 25% below the European average, demonstrating a 
drastic reduction that started in 2010. Emigration levels have started to grow again, returning to 1970s 
levels, while a dangerous increase in material deprivation (from 21.9% in 2012 to 25.5% in 2013) and 
in severe material deprivation (from 8.6% in 2012 to 10.9% in 2012) have been registered.25 In addi-
tion, there has been a significant decline in GDP, while the unemployment rate has increased from 
7.6% in 2008 to 16.2% in 2013, reaching 38.1% in the case of under-25 year olds.26 
Actually, this is not the first time that Portugal has received foreign assistance, since it resorted 
to IMF help twice before, in 1978 and again in 1983. Similarly to what is happening nowadays, as 
it will become clearer below, the country also reacted with growing protests, especially those as-
sociated with the working class. According to Ron Francisco’s protest events and coercion data-
base,27 the greatest number of protest events between 1980 and 1995 (170) were recorded in 1982, 
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which was also the second year in terms of the number of strikes (101). That was also the year 
in which the greatest number of citizens took part in protest events (3,091,355), most of them in 
strikes (2,911,845).28 Far more significant is the fact that, in that same year, there were two general 
strikes, the first since 1934.29 After the IMF intervened, conflictual activity decreased constantly until 
the end of the decade, and started growing again in 1988 and 1989, coinciding with the second gov-
ernment led by Cavaco Silva, the leader of the centre-right Social Democratic Party (PSD). He was 
appointed prime minister in 1985, and for a second term in 1987, when his party became the first 
in Portugal’s history to win an absolute majority in elections. His government implemented strong 
structural reforms to liberalise the Portuguese economy, including fiscal reform, the liberalisation 
of public enterprises and state media, and the reform of labour and agricultural legislation. Cavaco 
Silva governed Portugal until 1995, after his re-election in 1991. 
So, Portugal has been through prior periods of austerity, marked by strong attacks on the so-called 
“April victories”. Nevertheless, if the 1976 constitution had come under attack in other periods, as 
Miranda stresses, until recent years it seemed like the intrinsic values established in it – related to 
work, access to healthcare and education – were preserved. Moreover, if the criticism of the con-
stitution, seen as “blocking necessary reforms”, is not new in centre and rightwing circles, it seems 
that now this attack is occurring in a rather new way. In fact, it has found a new “legitimation” in a 
vision expressed by several influential foreign observers. For instance, in a report JP Morgan ex-
pressed the following opinion:
In the early days of the crisis, it was thought that these national legacy problems were largely 
economic: over-levered sovereigns, banks and households, internal real exchange rate mis-
alignments, and structural rigidities. But, over time it has become clear that there are also na-
tional legacy problems of a political nature. The constitutions and political settlements in the 
southern periphery, put in place in the aftermath of the fall of fascism, have a number of fea-
tures which appear to be unsuited to further integration in the region. When German politicians 
and policymakers talk of a decade-long process of adjustment, they likely have in mind the 
need for both economic and political reform.30
And moreover:
The political systems in the periphery were established in the aftermath of dictatorship, and 
were defined by that experience. Constitutions tend to show a strong socialist influence, re-
flecting the political strength that leftwing parties gained after the defeat of fascism … Polit-
ical systems around the periphery typically display several of the following features: weak 
executives; weak central states relative to regions; constitutional protection of labour rights; 
consensus building systems which foster political clientelism; and the right to protest if un-
welcome changes are made to the political status quo. The shortcomings of this political 
legacy have been revealed by the crisis. Countries around the periphery have only been par-
tially successful in producing fiscal and economic reform agendas, with governments con-
strained by constitutions (Portugal), powerful regions (Spain), and the rise of populist parties 
(Italy and Greece).31
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The boundaries that separate the political and financial levels are becoming more frailer, and this 
made an economical crisis turn into a political crisis in several countries. As Donatella Della Por-
ta writes:
The contemporary crisis is in fact a crisis of democracy even more and before than a financial 
crisis. Neo-liberalism was and, in fact, is, a political doctrine that brings with it a deteriorated 
vision of the public and democracy. It implied not only the less political interventions to balance 
social inequalities produced by the market (with policies of liberalisation, privatisation and de-
regulation), but also a very elitist (mainly electoral) conception of citizen participation, as well 
as an increased level of influence for lobbies and strong interests.32 
Consequently, foreign intervention, as observed in the JP Morgan report above, is not limited to 
the assessment of a country’s economic performance and the imposition of a path to achieve ob-
jectives in terms of its deficit, but it has also raised questions regarding internal politics, especially 
the instruments and mechanisms coded in national political systems considered opposite to mar-
ket logic. Hence, the reaction to austerity measures has obviously become, in many cases, a real 
reaction in the defence of constitutional rights established in each country. 
Therefore, the difference to previous moments of crisis and austerity in Portugal seems to be that 
the current situation is marked by a greater determination, by the political elite in power, to change 
the assumptions on which democratic Portugal rests, mostly the acquired rights related to labour 
and social protection, a will that can gain more legitimacy thanks to the international context and 
to Portugal’s current dependency on foreign assistance. 
Protest and austerity in Portugal since 2010
Apart from a few exceptions,33 many scientist traditionally consider Portuguese society as a scarce-
ly participant one, whether through institutional channels,34 such as elections, parties, associations, 
or nonconventional channels, such as demonstrations, petitions, strikes. If we look at some forms 
of participation, such as elections, this assumption holds true. Meanwhile, if we consider the gen-
eral framework of the political and social engagement of Portuguese citizens, the situation appears 
to be more complex. As mentioned before, Portuguese civil society has shown significant capacity 
to react in different situations. If on the one hand the PREC mobilisations developed a central role 
in “pushing” for a more radical break with the past, institutionalising social rights and speeding up 
the decolonisation process, it has been noted in successive moments that when these social vic-
tories are put up for discussion, Portuguese society has acted decisively.
This fact is also evident in the context of the current crisis. According to the European Social Survey 
in 2013, the proportion of respondents who said they had participated in a public demonstration 
in the previous year more than doubled, from 2.4% in 2010 to 6.8% in 2012. Indeed, Portugal was 
one of the European countries that saw the biggest increase in this indicator, along with Spain and 
Ireland. A study developed by Portuguese police confirmed this data. It shows that in Lisbon alone, 
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the number of demonstrations increased from 244 in 2010 to 298 in 2011 and to 579 (an average 
of one every 15 hours) in 2012.35 
A study recently developed on the basis of the protest event analysis method also points in this di-
rection.36 This study is based on a database of protest events in Portugal between 2010 and 2013, 
compiled by sampling three weekly issues of the Diario de Notícias news site, in the period from 1 
January 2010 to 31 July 2013. Included are all forms of contentious politics (for example, demon-
strations, occupations, petitions or strikes), coded according to its main player, target, demand, 
type of action, number of participants, place, time span and the existence of violence or not.
All data indicates the evolution of a protest cycle starting in 2010, which coincided with the arrival, 
in Portugal, of the international economical crisis and the adoption of the first measures to contain 
public spending. Since early that year, the socialist minority government had to undertake a series 
of public spending cuts, in an attempt to accomplish the deficit limits required by the eurozone. 
These measures were publically contested by numerous players, with the most significant epi-
sode being the 4 March general strike, which was followed by various demonstrations organised 
by the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (CGTP) in early July. Another general strike 
was organised in November and from that moment on social agitation grew significantly, reach-
ing its peak in the great demonstration organised by the Geração à Rasca (Desperate Generation) 
group on 12 March 2011. 
This demonstration was also linked to the crisis in the government and the decadence of socialist 
Prime Minister José Sócrates. In fact, a few days later, on 22 March 2011, Sócrates resigned after 
parliament voted down the so-called fourth stability and growth programme (PEC IV), which in-
troduced new austerity measures in order to contain the economic recession. The rejection of the 
PEC IV opened the way for external intervention, obliging Portugal to receive an international loan 
worth €78m, €52m of which came from the ECB and €26m from the IMF. After the elections of 5 
June 2011, a centre-right government, headed by the PSD leader, was established. Although some 
spending restrictions had already been adopted by the socialist government, it was from that mo-
ment on that the harshest austerity measures were applied, involving bigger cuts to public salaries, 
pensions, social benefits and services (mostly those associated with health and transport). Along 
with tax raises (mainly in VAT), these measures had a drastic effect on consumption and unem-
ployment levels (as noted above), creating a vicious cycle.37 
After the 2011 election, there were another two peaks in the protest flux. Firstly, in the second 
half of 2012; and secondly between March and June 2013. Both periods were marked by huge 
demonstrations, coinciding with critical moments in the process of applying austerity meas-
ures. The first one took place on 15 September 2012 and was marked by much anger over the 
government’s announcement to increase the unique social tax, a contributive social security tax 
applied on salaries. The second and greatest demonstration of that period, which took place on 
2 March 2013, raised more general concerns against the government and the troika memoran-
dum, at a time when its harsh consequences on Portuguese social and economic life had be-
come more and more evident. 
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Both the demonstrations were organised by the Que se Lixe a Troika: Queremos as Nossas Vi-
das de Volta (To hell with the troika: we want our lives back, QSLT) movement. Just like the afore-
mentioned Geração à Rasca, the QSLT movement also represents, from a certain perspective, a 
new conflictual player, with some analysts referring to it as the “new new social movements”.38 
Therefore it may be worth following its activity closer and at a deeper level. Sharing some similar 
aspects with the Spanish Indignados group, the Geração à Rasca movement emerged in Portugal 
sometime before. The 12 March 2011 demonstration was summoned through social networks 
by four friends (Paula Gil, Alexandre Carvalho, João Labrincha and António Frazão), who were in-
spired by Portuguese band Deolinda’s song “Parva que sou” (How dumb I am), which became the 
demonstration’s slogan. This song expresses the anxiety of a generation directly experiencing the 
difficulties of unemployment and precariousness.39 
As many authors have pointed out that, despite some transnational references – mostly to the Arab 
Spring – this movement’s identity, purpose and target, as in those that preceded them, are clearly 
national.40 This is clearly patent in its name, a direct reference to a prior juvenile movement from 
the early 1990s, Geração Rasca (Trashy Generation), which contested the education reforms and 
the tuition increases implemented by the PSD government.41 Explicitly nonparty, Geração à Rasca 
was able to summon the first of a cycle of huge demonstrations, the largest since the revolution-
ary period.42 From March 2011, some new organisations appeared. After the organisation of the 12 
March demonstration, Geração à Rasca organisers created the Movimento 12 de Março (12 March 
Movement, M12M) platform, which placed constant emphasis on refusing any type of party posi-
tioning, or a left–right axis, while adhering to José Saramago’s appeal of “turning every citizen into 
a politician”. During the summer of 2011, several other groups emerged from the M12M or con-
nected to it – among them Indignados Lisboa, Acampada Lisboa–Democracia Veradeira Já, Por-
tugal Uncut and Attac Portugal – aimed at the creation of the 15 October (15O) platform, which, in 
connection with other similar groups around the world, would end up organising the international 
demonstration on 15 October 2011. 
From this moment on, several alliances were built between the new new social movements and 
the traditional actors – such as trade unions or radical leftwing parties – though they were even-
tually marked by internal conflict and mutual distrust. There was an evident tendency towards a 
greater cooperation especially after October 2012, when the M12M leaders joined parts of the CGTP 
and the Left Bloc in order to create the Democratic Congress for Alternatives (CDA). The CDA man-
aged to gather 1,500 people seeking to develop a shared platform for the various movements and 
groups that were battling austerity.43 
On one hand, the CDA supported the demonstration organised by the QSLT. Just like the M12M and 
the 15O,44 the QSLT avoided explicit connection to parties (although many members were Left Bloc 
or PCP militants). Meanwhile, although terms like left and right were never mentioned, its leftwing 
position was clear, if not for the important presence of Left Bloc militants, of organisations such 
as the Precários Inflexíveis (Inflexible Precarious) and by the occasional alliance with the CGTP. On 
the other hand, despite the initial suspicion of the PCP towards the CDA and the new new social 
movements, the party was more willing to cooperate from 2012 onwards. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/12/2020 22:07:25 |
41
HISTOREIN VO
L
U
M
E
 15.1 (2015)
All the subsequent demonstrations, on 15 September (QSLT), 29 September 2012 (CGTP), and 2 
March 2013 (QSLT), drew reciprocal support from several organisations. On the other hand, the in-
creasing of references to historical symbols of protest and democracy in Portugal was significant. 
One example was the choice of “Grândola, Vila Morena”, a song used to signal the 1974 Carnation 
revolution, as the anthem of the large demonstration organised by the QSLT on 2 March 2013, in 
which 800,000 people took part in Lisbon alone, according to some observers. 
Throughout these four decades of democracy, there have been several attempts to mitigate the rev-
olutionary significance of 25 April, for example, during the so-called “Cavaquismo”45 – and also in the 
celebrations organised to mark the 30th anniversary of that event in 2004. In this last case, the official 
slogan of the celebrations was “April is evolution”, a definition that deliberately hid any revolutionary 
reference to 25 April. Despite these attempts, the importance of the revolution seemed to remain 
untouched in several broad sectors of society and was ready to be activated in moments of greater 
difficulty. The commemorative demonstrations are still very well attended, including by the youth. On 
the other hand, according to a survey conducted by the Institute for Social Sciences of Lisbon Uni-
versity and the Expresso newspaper, 25 April is considered to be the most important event in Portu-
guese history by 59% of the Portuguese. with higher rates recorded among less educated citizens.46
As we’ve seen before, the activation of symbols related to 25 April was also an important element 
for sustaining the mobilisations in this protest cycle against austerity. Before 2 March 2013, “Grân-
dola, Vila Morena” had already been sung by a group of militants attending a parliamentary debate 
on 15 February, interrupting the prime minister’s speech. Besides, the symbols and references to 
the coup, the MFA and the PREC were a common sight at demonstrations, where it was easy to 
spot posters asking for the “return of the military”. The memory of the Portuguese transition is still 
very strong in Portuguese society and is one of the foundations for social mobilisation, despite the 
revisionist attempts of the political elites. 
This situation is radically different, if not the opposite, to that described by Kostis Kornetis in the 
Spanish case. In fact, if the predominant memory of the collective Spanish ideal is that of an “agreed 
transition”, of democratisation as a moment of social appeasement, with which most Spaniards 
seem to identify, the social movements that emerged in the context of the crisis in Spain – the In-
dignados – “also involved, in some way, a radical reconceptualisation of the past”.47 They criticise 
this memory of a “model” regime change, without conflict, but also the regime change in itself, for 
not having led to a real disruption with the past. That would have had consequences in implement-
ing a real democracy in Spain. 
In Portugal, the revolutionary nature of the transition itself, mentioned in the 1976 constitution, nat-
urally represents an important resource for mobilisation. Meanwhile, there are reasons for this 
continuity over the years. Robert Fishman considers that the social revolution post-25 April caused 
a cultural renewal and the dissolution of the social hierarchy.48 That would have favoured the root-
ing of democratic practices, making Portuguese society more inclusive and open.
According to Tiago Fernandes, on the other hand, the social revolution that occurred after the coup 
was reflected in associations and Portuguese institutions and this explains the continuity that 25 
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April still has in the country.49 Hence, this does not mean a shared memory or a cultural reference 
exists, but something rather more structural and profound. This more “structuralist” explanation 
partly differs from that given by Fishman, who states that the legacy of 25 April in the country’s 
political and social processes is due to its cultural heritage. Both explanations are indeed comple-
mentary, although I think that without a strong structural continuity in institutions and civil society 
associations, this cultural heritage would have had fewer chances to persist.
As regards the new alliances between traditional and new actors, they have also been identified by 
several authors in many other countries. Maria Kousis and Christina Karakioulafi adopt the defi-
nition of meganetworks to explain them: “The recent economic contention against neo-liberal re-
forms and austerity policies in Southern European national, and less often transnational spaces … 
demonstrates the importance of ‘Meganetworks’ comprised of very broad cross class coalitions”.50 
On the other hand, Maria da Paz Campos Lima and Antonio Martin Artiles state that “it is important 
to underline that the escalation in mobilisations also delineated new relations between new social 
movements and trade union protests, which contributed to enforce both the mobilisations of each 
one and those organised in conjunction”.51
In the Portuguese case, the reasons behind this growing collaboration are obvious. In fact, if on 
the one hand the new new social movements have proved a great capability for mobilising people, 
many of whom are usually oblivious to protest, on the other hand they have shown serious diffi-
culty in continuously sustaining conflict. In his study on opposition networks, mainly focusing on 
the Russian case, Mark Beissinger stresses that movements strongly based on “virtual civil soci-
ety” – that is “not face-to-face associations, but digitally mediated social networks”52 – show high 
degrees of volatility. Yet, traditional players and mostly trade unions, although they receive less 
attention from the media, have shown a greater capability of maintaining a high conflict level, es-
pecially thanks to a more solid organisational structure. Yet, these have, on their own, a greater 
need to attract new forces and create roots in social areas from which they are usually absent – 
the precarious youth, students and unemployed. 
On the other hand, if one can detect the increasing use of social networks, which would predominant-
ly suggest the participation of certain sectors of society, such as the youth and the more educated 
people, other elements suggest that people mobilised in this cycle of protest are more varied. In this 
sense, the large geographical dispersion in demonstrations should be stressed. For instance, on 2 
March 2013, demonstrations with a strong participation of citizens took place in about 30 Portuguese 
cities. The participation of 600–700 citizens in demonstrations taking place in cities traditionally quite 
conservative, such as Viseu, Castelo Branco or Leiria, has been a significant innovation in this cycle 
of protest. Moreover, the participation of actors such as the Association of Retirees and Pension-
ers (APRE) questions the vision of the new new social movements as a mainly youth phenomenon.
On the other hand, an analysis of protest events that took place in Portugal between 2010 and 2013 
shows the predominance of protest related with labour issues. Despite public opinion’s insistence 
on protest approaches that have greater media impact, the traditional trade union players are still at 
the frontline of the struggle against austerity. During this period, 78 protest events (47.9% of the to-
tal) were organised by several public service trade unions, while 11 were called by one or both of the 
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trade union federations (CGTP or UGT) and 19 by private sector trade unions. Overall, about two-thirds 
of protest (66.3%) emerged from the labour area. In comparison, the new players, such as the QSLT, 
Geração à Rasca or M12M, fronted 19 events (11.7%), only a few more than those organised by pub-
lic and private sector consumers and clients (11.7%).53 Official data on strikes confirms this trend: the 
number of lost working days grew constantly from 2010 to 2013, and so has the participation in strikes. 
In recent years, the number of strikes organised by several joint trade unions has grown, showing 
signs of increasing coordination.54 Such increasing strike coordination is mostly confirmed by a huge 
growth in resorting to a classical struggle instrument: the general strike. In the first 35 years of de-
mocracy (1974–2009), trade unions organised only five general strikes; the same number was held 
in the three years from 2010. As stressed by several authors, an increase in general strikes is a phe-
nomenon that can be detected in many European countries since 2008.55 As Kousis and Karakioulafi 
state: “General strikes are different from economic strikes in that they are not directed against em-
ployees but government policies, while they also involve nationally focused mobilisations.56 
In Portugal’s case, this also meant a growing collaboration between the trade union federations, 
the CGTP and UGT, which previously had been viewed as being in opposition to one another. More-
over, the importance of trade unions and resorting to strikes as a means of struggle in recent mo-
bilisations in Portugal are also related to the role that these organisations have assumed as a re-
sult of the revolutionary process. As Fernandes states: “In Portugal, state transformations during 
the transition allowed for a higher control of the state apparatus by unions, especially the CGTP.”57 
The role that union organisations play would, hence, be a consequence of the revolution, which 
revealed itself as being important in the current protest cycle. In fact, Fernandes suggests that the 
revolution not only rendered more power to unions, but also turned them into central institutions in 
Portuguese political life, which they remain to this day. He also claims that, for this reason, labour 
protection is stronger than in Spain, as is the connection between unions and some political parties.
So, if social movement studies usually consider unions to be actors in contentious politics, hence 
primarily defiant of the government, the scenery is quite different in the Portuguese case. These 
organisations are structures that find themselves on the verge of “conventional politics”, when they 
act as government interlocutors, and “unconventional politics”, especially when they organise high-
ly conflictual actions such as general strikes.
Conclusions
The protest cycle that started in 2011 can be said to have concluded after the great demonstration 
of 2 March 2013. From this moment, mobilisation decreased radically, as can be verified by the 
scarce participation in demonstrations called by the QSLT platform on 1 June and 26 October 2013 
and 24 April 2014. Its platform appears rather unstructured, clearly evident in the lack of updates 
to its social media accounts and, mainly, of its Facebook page. Still, the CGTP-organised demon-
stration on 19 October 2013, which enjoyed no support from the UGT, has shown the different per-
spectives of antiausterity actors, such as the Left Bloc or CDA.
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On the other hand, the government seemed to maintain a certain level of stability, although some 
internal crises partly blocked the implementation of many of the planned austerity measures. 
In the 2014 European elections, in contrast to what happened in Greece or Spain, the so-called 
“radical leftwing” parties did not perform well,58 while support for the central bloc (PS and PSD) 
remained fairly stable. The bankruptcy in the summer of 2014 of Banco Espírito Santo (BES), the 
largest Portuguese private bank, following many cases of corruption and mismanagement, which 
would further aggravate the already critical Portuguese economical situation, was met with no 
protests whatsoever.
Amid this general context of demobilisation, the Constitutional Court entered the picture and was 
seen by the leftwing as the guardian of the conquests of April. This organ has systematically in-
validated some austerity measures introduced by the government. In July 2012, it ruled that the 
cuts to holiday and Christmas bonuses were unconstitutional as they contradicted the principle of 
equality, given that they applied only to public servants. On 26 September, the court annulled the 
reform of the labour code, and in May 2014 all cuts made to public service wages from 2011 were 
deemed to be unconstitutional, forcing the government to abolish them.
Just as was the case after the 1974–1975 protest cycle, the Constitutional Court in Portugal is once 
again an institutional actor – and a particularly important one as a guardian of the rule of law – and 
has stepped forward to deal with protest demands. If, as was seen after the PREC mobilisations, 
in a phase of reflux and moderate governments, the constitution reflected the requests, even the 
more radical ones, of the revolutionary process, something similar can now be witnessed. After 
two years of intense political struggle and at a time when mobilisation started to decrease almost 
to the point of ceasing altogether, the court emerged as the main actor in the defence of social 
rights in Portugal. The legacy is almost obvious, from the 1974–1975 protest cycles – which in-
fluenced the nature of the constitution – to the present, when it almost seems that the court has 
crossed sides to meet the protest demands. One might just surmise – although it may be difficult 
to ascertain with certainty – that the court would not have been as active were there not so much 
social pressure. In that case, the protest cycle would have, once again, had the ability to influence 
institutional politics, although in a different way to what would have been expected.
In any case, it is certain that, 40 years later, Portugal has relived a cycle of protest comparable only 
to that of the PREC, even though it is still too early to assess its results.
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